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I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of corporate officers’ personal liability under Delaware Corporate Law had 
been a complete uncertainty until recently. While Delaware courts remained silent on the issue, 
scholars engaged in a vehement debate about what fiduciary duties corporate officers owed 
under Delaware law. Two competing views were advanced. Professors Lyman Johnson and 
David Millon first advanced the argument that corporate officers were agents of the corporation, 
and thus are subject to the duties an agent owes to his principal under common law agency 
principles.
1
 The second view was first advanced by A. Gilchrist Sparks, III and Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh in 1992.
2
 Professors Sparks and Hamermesh argued that corporate officers owed 
identical fiduciary duties of loyalty and care as are owed by directors.
3
 Despite the ongoing 
debate about the liability of corporate officers, the Delaware courts did not decisively resolve the 
issue of officer liability until 2009. 
In Gantler v. Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly held that corporate 
officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation identical to the fiduciary duties owed by 
directors.
4
 Therefore, under the Court’s holding, an officer would be personally liable for 
breaches of the same duties of care and loyalty that are owed by directors.
5
 While this was a 
major development in Delaware Corporate Law, the Court left open a number of vital questions. 
Most importantly, the Court did not discuss whether the protections of the deferential business 
                                                 
1
 Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fidcuiaries, 
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005). 
2
 A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director 
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215 (1992). 
3
 Id. at 225. 
4
 Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009). 
5
 Id. 
 2 
judgment rule applied to corporate officers as it does to directors.
6
 Furthermore, the Court did 
not decide whether corporate officers could be exculpated for breaches of their duty of care 
under Delaware General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7), which allows a corporation to limit 
or completely eliminate, in its certificate of incorporation, its directors’ liability for breaches of 
their duty of care.
7
 Rather, the Court expressly left this decision to the Delaware legislature to 
resolve.
8
 The legislature’s inaction following Gantler is likely a signal that the exculpation 
provisions of Section 102(b)(7) will not be extended to corporate officers. However, the business 
judgment rule issue still remains open for debate. 
The next major judicial decision affecting corporate officer liability came in 
Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ct. Ch. 2016). In Amalgamated, the 
Chancery Court reaffirmed the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Gantler that officers owe 
fiduciary duties identical to those directors owe, but added that officers are also “agents who 
report to the board of directors” and “have a duty to provide the board of directors with the 
information that the directors need to perform their statutory and fiduciary roles.”9 
Characterizing corporate officers as agents potentially has significant consequences for the 
fiduciary duties that officers owe corporations. As an agent of the corporation, an officer’s 
fiduciary duties are likely not limited to the traditional duties of care and loyalty. Rather, a 
corporate officer owes two additional duties to his principal, the corporation acting through the 
board, under common law agency principles: the duty of obedience and the duty to inform.
10
 
                                                 
6
 Id. 
7
 Id. at 709 n.37; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015). 
8
 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37. 
9
 Amalgamated, 132 A.3d at 780-81 (it is important that the CEO of Yahoo was also sitting on 
the Yahoo board at the time of litigation, but was sued in her capacity as an officer). 
10
 Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (cite 
forthcoming) (2017). 
 3 
Even after these two major developments concerning the duties corporate officers owe 
under Delaware law, the issue of whether the business judgment rule applies to officers has 
remained unresolved. Only two courts have considered the question, and both cases were 
decided prior to Gantler and Amalgamated. In In re Tower Air, Inc., the Third Circuit affirmed 
the holding of the District Court for the District of Delaware by applying the business judgment 
rule to the decision of the defendant corporate officers involved.
11
 However, the Third Circuit 
simply assumed, with no analysis, that the Delaware courts would review officer decisions under 
the business judgment rule. Thus, the Third Circuit’s decision is not indicative of how the 
Delaware Supreme Court will decide the question.  
The only Delaware case to hold that the business judgment rule applies to corporate 
officers is Ella M. Kelly & Wyndham, Inc. v. Bell.
12
 Although this case is important, as it is a 
Delaware Supreme Court case, it is not clear that the Court would rule similarly if faced with the 
same question today. As in Tower, the Court in Ella M. Kelly simply assumed that the business 
judgment rule applied to officers without any reasoning supporting its decision. Furthermore, the 
officers in question also sat on the board, and it is not clear whether the court would decide the 
rule also applies to an officer who does not also serve as a director. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether corporate officers’ fiduciary duties differ 
from those of corporate directors under Delaware law because of officers’ status as agents of the 
corporation, and whether the Delaware courts should review officers’ decisions under the 
deferential business judgment rule when determining whether those officers breached their duty 
of care to the corporation. In Part II, I will discuss the duties owed by corporate officers, and I 
argue that officers should have a higher duty of care than directors because of their position as 
                                                 
11
 In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 238 (3d. Cir. 2005). 
12
 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970). 
 4 
agents of the corporation. In Part III, I will argue that the business judgment rule should apply to 
the business decisions of corporate officers, but corporate officers should be held to an ordinary 
negligence standard under business judgment review, not the gross negligence standard 
applicable to director decisions. Part IV will discuss who should be considered an “officer” for 
purposes of business judgment rule protection.
13
 Finally, Part V will discuss why there is not 
likely to be an increase in suits against corporate officers despite the major developments in 
theories to hold them personally liable. 
II. WHAT IS THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AS AGENTS OF THE 
CORPORATION? 
 
Corporate officers hold an interesting position under Delaware law because the Delaware 
Supreme Court has held that officers not only have fiduciary duties identical to those that 
directors owe
14
, the duties of care and loyalty, but that officers also have duties flowing from 
their position as agents of the corporation, their principal, which are the duty to inform the board 
of material information and the duty of obedience.
15
 As such, officers must owe a higher duty of 
care than the board because officers’ fiduciary duties are created by common law agency 
principles. Outside directors, those directors not holding officer positions within the company, 
are only subjected to a gross negligence standard of care. To understand why officers must have 
a higher standard of care than directors, it is first important to discuss the differences between the 
position of directors and officers in the corporate governance structure and why officers’ 
positions as agents of the corporation require that they have a higher duty of care than the board.  
                                                 
13
 Many modern corporations, especially large banks or investment companies, have thousands 
of vice presidents. It is important to distinguish which employees possessing these officer-level 
titles will be considered “officers” for the purpose of receiving the protection of the business 
judgment rule. This issue will be discussed in-depth in Part IV.  
14
 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708-09. 
15
 Amalgamated, 132 A.3d at 780-81. 
 5 
Directors are given broad power under Delaware law to manage “the business and 
affairs” of the corporation.16 However, it is unrealistic to assume that a board could manage all of 
the daily business affairs because of the mammoth size of some modern corporations.
17
 Instead, 
Delaware Code Section 141(a) allows the board to delegate a significant amount of its 
management authority to the officers whom the board appoints.
18
 The board decides on the 
officers’ compensation, sets the limits of the officers’ delegated managerial authority, and 
monitors the officers’ performance.19 Thus, although officers exercise substantial discretion on 
behalf of the corporation, they are nonetheless agents of the corporation acting through its board 
because officers may only exercise the discretion specifically delegated to them by the board. 
Because of their position as agents of the corporation, rather than the entity acting as the 
corporation like the board, corporate officers owe a number fiduciary duties to the corporation 
flowing from agency law principles. Corporate officers status as agents creates their fiduciary 
duties and also provides a basis to hold officers to a higher standard of care than directors. 
A. Fiduciary Duties Owed by Officers 
Agent status is a consensual relationship which includes fiduciary duties independent 
from those expressly included in contract.
20
 Therefore, although many officers may not have an 
express written contract, they nonetheless owe specified fiduciary duties arising under common 
law agency principles.
21
 The most important fiduciary duty owed by officers is the duty of 
                                                 
16
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
17
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1607. 
18
 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(a) (emphasis added) (stating that any corporation “shall be 
managed by or under the direction of” a board of directors). 
19
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1607. 
20
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
21
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1629-30. 
 6 
loyalty.
22
 The duty of loyalty requires the agent to act in the best interests of the principal, and 
not on behalf of anyone with interests adverse to the principal.
23
 Corporate officers must act in 
accordance with the best interests of the corporation, acting through its board. Therefore, 
corporate officers’ duty of loyalty to the corporation mimics the duty of loyalty that directors 
owe to corporate shareholders, under which the directors must act solely in the best interests of 
the shareholders.  
However, as Professors Johnson and Millon have argued, it has not been determined 
whether officers’ duty of loyalty is wholly identical to the duty owed by directors.24 For 
example, it is not clear whether officers’ duty of loyalty requires them to maximize shareholder 
wealth in the event of a takeover as it does directors.
25
 The argument advanced by Professors 
Johnson and Millon is that officers do not owe any duties directly to the shareholders because 
officers only owe fiduciary duties to their principal, the corporation acting through its board.
26
 
However, an effective counterargument can be made that officers must make efforts to maximize 
shareholder wealth in the event of a takeover. Officers must act with the best interests of the 
corporation in mind because the corporation is their principal. The corporation’s goal is to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Therefore officers, as agents of the corporation, must act to further 
their principal’s goal of maximizing shareholder wealth in the event of a takeover. Nevertheless, 
the specific issue has not been heavily debated, nor has it come before any Delaware court. 
Corporate officers’ positions as agents of the corporation also creates two duties owed by 
officers that are separate from the typical fiduciary duties directors owe under corporate law: the 
                                                 
22
 Id. at 1630. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at 1630-31. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. 
 7 
duty of obedience
27
 and the duty to inform the board of material information.
28
 The duty of 
obedience is the agent’s duty to comply strictly with the reasonable directives of her principal.29 
The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines the duty of obedience as the “duty to comply with all 
lawful instructions received from the principal and persons designated by the principal 
concerning the agent’s actions on behalf of the principal.”30  
Following the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement in Amalgamated that corporate 
officers are agents of the corporation, it seems appropriate to extend the duty of obedience to 
corporate officers. As an agent of the corporation, a corporate officer is required under agency 
law to comply with the reasonable directives of his principal, the corporation acting through its 
board.
31
 This is supported by the comment to § 8.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act, 
which states that “an officer is expected to observe the duties of obedience and loyalty” as well 
as the duty of care.
32
 Furthermore, requiring officers to comply with the lawful instructions of 
directors is consistent with Delaware corporate law because the board cannot wholly abdicate its 
management authority under Delaware Code § 141(a).
33
 Thus, corporate officers, as agents of the 
corporation, must comply with the limits set by the board when delegating its managerial 
                                                 
27
 Demott, supra note 10, *14. 
28
 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 226-27. 
29
 Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: 
Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 28, 44-45 (2010); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08(2) (2006). 
30
 Id. 
31
 See id. at 46. 
32
 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.42 cmt. (4
th
 ed. 2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 379(1) (1958). 
33
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 8 
authority to the officers.
34
 Otherwise, the officers would be exercising the full managerial 
authority granted solely to the board by Section 141(a).
35
 
The duty to inform the board is not specifically created by Delaware law, but it can be 
inferred from the statutory requirement that directors manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation, and from officers’ role as their agents.36 As previously mentioned, it is impractical 
to expect a board to fully manage the day-to-day activities of a large corporation. Therefore, 
Delaware law allows a director, in the performance of her duties, to rely in good faith “upon such 
information, opinions, reports or statements presented” by any of the corporation’s officers.37 
Furthermore, under agency law, an agent is required to use “reasonable efforts to give his 
principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him.”38 Thus, officers’ positions as 
agents of the corporation gives rise to a duty to inform the board of any information relevant to 
the board’s duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.39 
Yet the most important, and heavily debated, of the fiduciary duties owed by corporate 
officers is the duty of care that officers owe to the corporation. Under Delaware law, directors 
are not liable for breaches of their duty of care for ordinary negligence, if they possess all 
reasonably available material information, because of the application of the business judgment 
rule to directors’ decisions.40 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the directors acted with gross 
                                                 
34
 Shaner, supra note 29, at 46. 
35
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
36
 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 226-27. 
37
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c). 
38
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958). 
39
 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 227. 
40
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 745 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (finding that the standard of review for director’s breach of 
duty of care is “less exacting” than review for ordinary negligence). 
 9 
negligence or acted with bad faith to succeed on such a claim.
41
 Therefore, the key question 
when determining an officer’s personal liability for breaches of his duty of care is what standard 
of care should be applicable.  
There are two prominent arguments that have been advanced by commentators. The first, 
advanced by Professors Hamermesh and Sparks, is that corporate officers owe a duty of care to 
the corporation identical to the duty owed by directors.
42
 Under this argument, courts would 
apply the business judgment rule to officers’ decisions, and officers would only breach their duty 
of care by acting with gross negligence or engaging in self-dealing. The second prominent 
argument, pushed by Professors Johnson and Millon, is that officers have duties distinct from 
directors because officers are agents of the corporation.
43
 Therefore, they argue that officers, who 
are not also directors or are not being sued in their capacity as directors, should be held to the 
higher standard of ordinary negligence.
44
  
Following Gantler, it seemed that the Delaware Supreme Court had adopted the 
argument advanced by Professors Hamermesh and Sparks when it held that officers owed 
fiduciary duties identical to those of directors.
45
 However, after the Court’s characterization of 
officers as agents of the corporation in Amalgamated,
46
 it appears that Delaware law is moving 
towards holding officers to the more exacting standard of ordinary negligence that is applicable 
                                                 
41
 Id. 
42
 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 225-26. 
43
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1631. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708-09. 
46
 Amalgamated, 132 A.3d at 780-81. 
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to agents under agency law principles.
47
 This is the correct outcome because of the inherent 
differences between corporate directors and officers. 
B. Courts Should Hold Officers to an Ordinary Negligence Standard for Breaches of Their 
Duty of Care. 
 
Holding officers to the more exacting ordinary negligence standard is the better policy, 
and it is supported by the differences in compensation, responsibilities, and roles within the 
corporate structure occupied by officers and directors.
48
 First, the increased personal liability of 
officers by holding them to an ordinary negligence standard is offset by the enormous 
compensation packages that they receive.
49
 Although some officers receive a low base salary, 
similar to directors, their total compensation is supplemented by bonuses, stock and option 
awards, and changes in pension value.
50
 In contrast, in 2016, the median total compensation for 
the highest paid directors was only $260,000.
51
 
As such, Professors Johnson and Millon argue that subjecting officers to the much less 
exacting gross negligence standard applicable to directors would create an imbalance in the 
corporate structure.
52
 This is so because directors and officers would be taking on the same 
amount of risk, but outside directors would be taking that risk for substantially less compensation 
                                                 
47
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1631 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 379 and 
Official Comment (1958)). 
48
 Id., at 1631. 
49
 Forbes, An Extraordinary Anomaly: Executive Compensation, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gurufocus/2016/06/29/an-extraordinary-anomaly-executive-
compensation/#64c7a6e1ab87 (accessed April 4, 2017) (stating that the average compensation 
for the top 200 executive officers in 2015 was $17.6 million). 
50
 Id. 
51
 Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 2016 
Director Compensation Report, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/12/2016-director-
compensation-report/ (accessed April 4, 2017). 
52
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1631. 
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than officers.
53
 Thus, because officers receive such high-level compensation, they should be 
subject to a higher standard of care when making business decisions for the corporation. 
Officers’ enormous compensation packages are justified by the high levels of skill, competence, 
and experience that they bring to the corporation. Officers are expected to perform in a manner 
that substantially benefits the corporation because they possess, and are hired for, these special 
skills and knowledge. Holding officers to the less exacting gross negligence standard for their 
business decisions is contrary to the justifications for paying them such high-level compensation.  
Additionally, applying the higher standard of care to officers is justified by the 
differences in responsibilities attributable to directors and officers. First, officers are agents of 
the corporation responsible for its day-to-day management. Therefore, officers are appointed by 
the board because of their knowledge and expertise in management and the particular industry of 
the corporation.
54
 When an agent is hired by a principal on the basis of special skills or 
knowledge, the principal is justified in expecting performance consistent with possession of that 
special skillset or knowledge.
55
 Thus, it follows that officers should be subject to the same 
standard of care that agents owe to their principals when carrying out their duties, which is a 
standard of ordinary negligence.
56
 Holding officers to the less exacting gross negligence standard 
would allow for broad deviations from the particular knowledge, skills, and competence that 
caused the board to appoint the officers in the first place.  
                                                 
53
 Id. 
54
 Demott, supra note 10, at *21-22. 
55
 Id. at *23 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08). 
56
 Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1631 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 379 and 
Official Comment (1958)). 
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Furthermore, as manager of the corporation’s daily operations, an officer has far greater 
access to material information about the corporation than the directors.
57
 Therefore, it makes 
sense to hold officers to a higher standard of care in decision-making than the gross negligence 
standard applicable to directors. Additionally, because of this information disparity, Delaware 
law allows directors to rely in good faith on the information presented to them by officers.
58
 As 
argued by Professor Demott, directors are likely to be reluctant to rely on information provided 
by officers if the officers are only held personally liable for actions deemed to be grossly 
negligent.
59
 Such a result would disrupt the normal functioning of the corporate governance 
structure.
60
 It is not logical to apply the same gross negligence standard applicable to detached 
directors, who rely on officers to provide them with material information about the corporation’s 
business, to those officers who are involved in the day-to-day operations of the corporation. 
Some commentators argue that holding officers personally liable under this heightened 
standard of care will make it more difficult to recruit candidates for officer positions. One of the 
major policy justifications for applying the gross negligence standard of review to director 
decisions is to encourage those directors to serve and make risky decisions.
61
 Some analysts 
believe that applying the ordinary negligence standard to officers will dissuade potential officers 
from serving, or will cause officers to become incredibly risk-averse to avoid personal liability 
for bad decisions.
62
  
                                                 
57
 Demott, supra note 10, at *22. 
58
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e). 
59
 Demott, supra note 10, at *24. 
60
 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 1, at 1630 (acknowledging that the board of directors rarely 
meets and lacks “intimate knowledge of the corporation’s activities”). 
61
 Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 
455 (2005). 
62
 Sparks & Hamermesh, supra note 2, at 230. 
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While this is a compelling argument for applying the less demanding standard to 
directors, it is simply not a reality for officers because of the differences in officer compensation 
compared to director compensation. Outside directors need liability protection to induce risk 
taking as a result of their relatively small stock ownership.
63
 Companies have begun to offer 
outside directors more stock ownership to align their interests with stockholders.
64
 Nevertheless, 
the total value of their stock and cash compensation still averages out at $260,000
65
, far less than 
what top corporate officers receive.
66
 Further, officer compensation is much more incentivized 
than director compensation in the United States because of bonuses, additional stock awards, and 
stock options that are contingent on meeting certain earnings or sales targets.
67
 As a result, 
corporate officers, unlike directors, are induced to take investment risks to achieve these 
corporate goals and receive the attached bonuses.
68
 Not only are officers more incentivized to 
take risks than directors, they also receive much higher compensation as a reward than directors 
receive.
69
 
Furthermore, as Professor Johnson points out, there is no empirical evidence supporting 
the claim that potential candidates are straying from accepting officer positions as a result of 
heightened personal liability.
70
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly increased the personal 
liability of company CEOs and CFOs for certain compliance violations. Section 302 of the 
                                                 
63
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 458. 
64
 Harvard Law School, supra note 51 (recognizing steady growth in stock offerings as part of 
outside directors’ compensation). 
65
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 458. 
66
 Forbes, supra note 49 (average salary for top 200 executive officers was $17.6 million in 
2015). 
67
 Id. 
68
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 460. 
69
 Id.; see also Forbes, supra note 49 (top 200 corporate officers received $17.6 million in total 
compensation in 2015 compared to $260,000 for directors of top 100 companies). 
70
 Id. at 460-61. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the CEO and CFO to implement internal controls that ensure 
compliance with financial reporting, to review the effectiveness of these internal controls, and to 
personally sign a certification stating that the internal controls are effective to the best of the 
officers’ knowledge.71 While there is some evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley has made it harder to 
recruit directors, there is no such evidence suggesting a drop in potential candidates for officer 
positions.
72
 A more compelling argument for applying the gross negligence standard to officers’ 
decisions is that courts do not have the expertise to interfere in business decisions.
73
 While this 
argument supports applying the business judgment rule to officers’ decisions, it does not justify 
holding them to a lower standard of care because of the reasons discussed above. 
III. A LIMITED VERSION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD APPLY TO OFFICERS. 
The business judgment rule is a cornerstone principle of Delaware corporate law, and 
corporate law generally, which is based on the proposition that corporate directors should not 
suffer strict judicial scrutiny of every business decision made.
74
 The rule applies when a court is 
reviewing whether a board breached its duty of care to shareholders when making a business 
decision. It requires courts to look at the decision-making process utilized by the board in 
reaching its business decision, not the actual substance of the decision itself. The business 
judgment rule is a presumption by Delaware courts that “in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”75 Absent self-dealing or gross 
negligence, a board’s business decision will be insulated from judicial review of the decision’s 
                                                 
71
 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012). 
72
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 461. 
73
 Id. at 462. 
74
 Id. at 453. 
75
 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 15 
merits by the business judgment rule.
76
 However, the business judgment rule and its protections 
do not apply to certain board decisions, including a board’s actions concerning a hostile tender 
offer, or its conclusion concerning a special committee’s decision about a stockholder’s 
derivative claim.
77
  
Despite the business judgment rule’s inapplicability in some situations, Delaware law 
allows corporations to completely insulate directors from personal liability for breaches of their 
duty of care, absent a breach of good faith.
78
 Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law allows any corporation to place a provision in its certificate of incorporation 
“eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director” for breaches of his duty of care.79 As 
mentioned earlier, Section 102(b)(7) does not apply to corporate officers,
80
 and legislative 
inaction following Gantler signals legislative intent that the section should not be extended to 
them. Therefore, the major issue for officers’ personal liability for breaches of their duty of care 
is whether their decisions will be afforded deference under the business judgment rule.  
The business judgment rule should apply to the business decisions of officers because 
officers are exercising broad authority delegated to them by the board when making these 
decisions. However, the rule should not apply when an officer has exhibited ordinary negligence 
in the decision-making process or has engaged in self-dealing. Furthermore, the rule’s 
protections should not be available for claims that officers breached their duty to inform the 
board or their duty of obedience because it only applies to duty of care claims. To understand 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 812-13. 
77
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 454. 
78
 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
79
 Id. 
80
 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37. 
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why the business judgment rule should be extended to officers, it is first important to understand 
the original policy justifications for applying the rule to directors. 
A. The Customary Policy Rationales Supporting the Business Judgment Rule's Application 
to Directors’ Business Decisions. 
 
There are three main policy justifications for the business judgment rule: encouraging 
directors to serve and take investment risks, preventing judicial encroachment into business 
decisions, and preserving the board’s central decision-making role in the corporate governance 
structure.
81
 As discussed in the preceding section, the first justification, encouraging directors to 
serve and take risks, is not as applicable to corporate officers because of their large and highly 
incentivized compensation packages. However, the second and third policy rationales are just as 
applicable to corporate officers as they are to directors. Prior to discussing their application to 
officer decision-making, it is important to first briefly explain the second and third policy 
rationales.  
Probably the strongest justification for the rule is to avoid judicial encroachment into the 
business decisions of corporate directors.
82
 Courts are not equipped with the information and 
business expertise to second-guess the business decisions of corporate management.
83
 There are 
two important justifications for avoiding strict judicial scrutiny of corporate directors’ business 
decisions. First, the deference afforded by the rule prevents courts from overreaching and 
replacing the past judgments of a board of directors with the retrospective judgments of the 
courts.
84
 While the board may think a decision is reasonable when made because it resulted from 
a careful decision-making process, future events, unknown at the time the decision was made, 
                                                 
81
 Johnson, supra note 61, at 455. 
82
 Id. at 456. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id.  
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may make the decision seem like a colossal oversight in retrospect.
85
 The business judgment rule 
prevents courts from improperly holding directors personally liable for carefully reasoned 
decisions that fail as a result of these future events. Instead, it focuses the courts’ scrutiny on 
whether the directors used a reasonable process and availed themselves of all pertinent 
information prior to making the decision.
86
  
The second justification for avoiding judicial scrutiny of a business decision’s merits is that 
directors already face potential sanctions from stockholders.
87
 Stockholders have the ability to 
vote directors off the board for poor business decisions. Historically, stockholders have not had 
much power to effect change on the board because they did not have the power to nominate 
directors. However, under SEC Rule 14A-8, a stockholder owning three percent of a 
corporation’s stock for at least three years may now submit a proposal for the corporation to 
include stockholder nominees in the board elections up to twenty-five percent of the board.
88
 
This gives stockholders some limited say in the removal of directors for poor decision-making. 
Judges are not subject to the same type of public sanctions for poor decisions. Thus, they should 
defer to the business decisions of directors, who are equipped with business expertise, and allow 
stockholder sanctions to punish poor decision-making.
89
 
The final rationale supporting the business judgment rule is that it preserves the board’s 
traditional position at the center of corporate governance.
90
 Under Delaware law, the board is 
tasked with managing and directing the business and affairs of the corporation.
91
 The business 
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judgment rule seeks to preserve this central role of the board by preventing judges from 
substituting their own business decisions for the decisions of the board.
92
 By doing so, judges 
would essentially usurp the board’s central decision-making position in the corporation. 
Furthermore, the business judgment rule prevents a corporation’s shareholders from attempting 
to supplant the board’s traditional central role by filing constant derivative suits to challenge the 
merits of the board’s decisions.93 By insulating the board’s decision from review on the merits, 
the business judgment rule ensures that the board remains at the center of the corporate 
governance structure as Delaware law intends.
94
  
These two policy justifications for the rule’s application to board decisions apply with 
equal force to the decisions of corporate officers. Thus, the Delaware courts should review an 
officer’s business decision under the business judgment rule when determining whether that 
decision amounted to a breach of her duty of care. However, the business judgment rule should 
not apply when the officer exhibited ordinary negligence in the decision-making process or 
engaged in self-dealing. Further, the rule should not be available for claims that an officer 
breached her duty to inform the board or her duty of obedience because the business judgment 
rule is only applicable for duty of care claims. 
B. The Customary Policy Rationales Supporting the Business Judgment Rule Support 
Extending the Rule’s Protections to Corporate Officers. 
 
Courts should employ the business judgment rule when reviewing the business decisions 
of corporate officers who are defending against claims that they breached their duty of care to the 
corporation. This extension to corporate officers is vital to avoid judicial encroachment into 
corporate management and to preserve the role of officers in the corporate governance structure. 
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As discussed in Part II, the protections of the rule are not needed to persuade candidates to accept 
officer positions and to take risks while in those positions. Nevertheless, the second and third 
rationales apply with equal force to directors and officers. Therefore, the business judgment rule 
should be extended to corporate officers. 
The strongest justification for extending the business judgment rule to corporate officers 
is to avoid strict judicial scrutiny of the merits of their business decisions. This justification 
applies with at least equal, if not greater, force to officers as it does to directors.
95
 Corporate 
officers are involved in the day-to-day management of the corporation and its business affairs, 
and are chosen by the board because of their particular knowledge and expertise in the 
corporation’s industry.96 As such, the officers not only possess greater knowledge and expertise 
in the industry than the directors, but the officers also have greater access to pertinent 
information than the directors.
97
 Therefore, judges are actually better suited to review the merits 
of a board’s decision because the directors are much more detached and lack the wealth of 
pertinent information and skills that corporate officers possess.
98
 It is much harder to justify 
judicial encroachment into the business decisions of a corporate officer who was chosen because 
of her requisite knowledge and expertise and is also intimately familiar with the daily operations 
of the corporation. Consequently, it is likely even more justifiable to prevent judicial 
encroachment into business decisions of corporate officers. 
The third rationale supporting the business judgment rule, preserving the board’s central 
governance role, also supports extension of business judgment review to officers because the 
board delegates a substantial amount of its managerial authority to its officers. While it is true 
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that officers are agents of the corporation, their special position in the corporate governance 
structure distinguishes them from ordinary common law agents.
99
 Corporate officers are 
delegated and exercise vast managerial discretion to implement the broad corporate policies 
created by the board.
100
 Similar to lawyers, corporate officers generally have freedom to 
reasonably decide how to perform their job so as to accomplish the broad end goal provided by 
their client, the corporation acting through the board.
101
  
Additionally, the board, acting for the corporation, is unlike typical common law 
principals in that it generally creates extremely broad corporate goals and leaves it to its agents, 
the officers, to determine how to best achieve those goals.
102
 Unlike the typical principal-agent 
relationship, vast discretion over the substantive decision-making is purposefully delegated to the 
agent with few constraints.
103
 Thus, it does not follow that an officer should be held liable for the 
merits of a decision purposefully delegated to him by the board when that decision would be 
reviewed under the business judgment rule if the board had made the decision itself. 
Finally, as Professors Johnson and Ricca have argued, corporate officers operate in all 
industries.
104
 Because of this variation, norms do not develop as to what reasonable substantive 
decisions are for all corporate officers as they do for agents who only operate within a particular 
industry.
105
 Courts do not have the expertise or knowledge to develop reasonable norms for 
every distinct industry that corporate officers are active in. Therefore, it is proper to apply the 
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business judgment rule to officers’ decisions and review their decision-making processes rather 
than the substantive wisdom of the decision itself.
106
 
Some commentators believe that extending the business judgment rule to officers will 
actually harm the board’s central role in corporate governance.107 This argument was first 
advanced by Professor Lyman Johnson, who has since retracted it and argued for extension of 
the business judgment rule to officers’ decisions. Nevertheless, it is still important to discuss this 
counterargument and why it should not prevent extension of the rule to officers. The argument is 
based on the statutory right of directors to pursue a breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
officers under Delaware law.
108
 The argument states that when a board decides to pursue a claim 
against an officer for breach of his fiduciary duty of care, the court should not defer to the 
officer’s decision under the business judgment rule because the court would be substituting its 
judgment about the officer’s decision for the board’s judgment.109 Some see this as usurping the 
board’s duty, under Delaware law, to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, which 
includes pursuing litigation on behalf of the corporation.
110
 
This counterargument must fail for three reasons: 1) the board still retains the power for 
intra-firm sanctions of officers, 2) corporate officers are exercising the board’s own delegated 
authority when making these business decisions, and 3) the officers, as agents of the corporation, 
would be held to the more exacting ordinary negligence standard under business judgment rule 
review. First, the board still retains the power to fire, demote, or reduce the pay of corporate 
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officers for poor decision-making or breaches of their fiduciary duties.
111
 As Professor Johnson 
himself later argued, boards often choose intra-firm sanctions rather than initiating lawsuits 
against officers.
112
 Second, as discussed above, officers are exercising delegated board authority 
when making the business decisions that would be subject to review.
113
 It would be contradictory 
to apply the deferential business judgment standard to review to board decisions in the first 
instance, but apply a stricter standard of review when those same decisions are instead made by 
officers acting under delegated authority from the board.  
Finally, as will be discussed in depth in the next section, corporate officers should be held 
to an ordinary negligence standard under business judgment rule review. Thus, while the courts 
could not review the merits of the decision, the officer’s decision-making process will still be 
reviewed for ordinary negligence, not the gross negligence standard applicable to board 
decisions. This prevents courts from undermining “the board’s decision to hold its agent to the 
relevant standard” of care as Professor Johnson warned because the relevant standard of care for 
agents is the ordinary negligence standard.
114
 
C. The Business Judgment Rule’s Application to Officers Should be More Limited than its 
Application to Directors. 
 
As mentioned, the business judgment rule is a presumption by Delaware courts, when 
determining whether a board breached its duty of care, that “in making a business decision the 
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action was taken in the best interests of the company.”115 The rule does not apply to a board’s 
decision if there were instances of self-dealing by the directors, or when the directors were 
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grossly negligent in their decision-making.
116
 Furthermore, the business judgment rule does not 
apply to certain board decisions, including a board’s decision concerning the response to a 
hostile tender offer or in reviewing a special committee’s decision to terminate a stockholder’s 
derivative claim.
117
 Similarly, although the business judgment rule should apply to the business 
decisions of officers, it must apply in a limited fashion. 
First, and most importantly, the business judgment rule should not apply to the review of 
an officer’s decision if the officer exhibited ordinary negligence in the decision-making process 
or engaged in self-dealing. As discussed in Part II of this paper, officers are agents of the 
corporation. Consequently, corporate officers derive their fiduciary duties from common law 
agency principles.
118
 Agency law imposes a standard of ordinary negligence on agents when 
performing tasks for their principals.
119
 As agents of the corporation, corporate officers should be 
held to the ordinary negligence standard applicable to other agents.
120
 Even though corporate 
officers are not typical agents because of the wide discretion delegated to them by the board, this 
should not lessen the duty of care owed by the agent-officers. It merely justifies extending the 
protections of the business judgment rule to their business decisions so that judicial review is 
limited to a review of whether the decision-making process was negligent. Therefore, corporate 
officers should be held to an ordinary negligence standard, and the business judgment rule 
should not be available to an officer who was negligent in the decision-making process or who 
exhibited self-dealing during that process. 
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Furthermore, the business judgment rule should not apply at all for claims that a 
corporate officer breached his duty to inform the board of material information. As mentioned, 
the business judgment rule does not apply to certain board decisions, such as a board’s response 
to a hostile tender offer or a board’s review of a litigation committee’s decision to pursue or not 
pursue derivative litigation.
121
 Similarly, the business judgment rule should not apply to a claim 
that an officer breached his duty to inform the board because Delaware law expressly permits a 
board to rely, in good faith, on the information presented to it by the corporation’s officers.122 It 
is a basic principle in Delaware law that that the board of directors cannot possibly be involved 
in every facet of the business, and therefore, the directors cannot possibly possess all material 
information relevant to making major corporate policy decisions.
123
 This is recognized by 
Delaware Code Section 141, which allows the board to delegate its authority and also rely in 
good faith on reports furnished by corporate officers.
124
  
As such, when an officer fails to inform the board of relevant and material information, 
courts should not merely review whether the officer’s decision-making process was negligent by 
failing to consider whether the undisclosed piece of information was material. Rather, courts 
should apply stricter scrutiny and examine whether the corporate officer’s actual decision that 
the undisclosed information was not material or relevant was negligent. This strict scrutiny is 
necessary for the normal functioning of a corporation because the board of directors must be able 
to rely on officers to provide all relevant and material information. If officers are protected by 
the business judgment presumption that they made a good faith decision that a piece of evidence 
was not relevant or material, then officers may become more reluctant to disclose information 
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that could reflect negatively on their performance. Thus, officers should not be afforded the 
protections of the business judgment rule in relation to their duty to disclose relevant and 
material information to the board. Instead, courts should look beyond the mere decision-making 
process and determine whether the actual decision not to disclose a piece of information was 
negligent. 
Finally, the protections of the business judgment rule should not apply to claims that an 
officer breached her duty of obedience. The duty of obedience requires that an agent “comply 
with all lawful instructions received from the principal.”125 As an agent of the corporation, a 
corporate officer has the duty to obey all lawful instructions of the board because the board is the 
body that acts on behalf of the corporation.
126
 While corporate officers are given wide discretion 
to act on behalf of the corporation, they are nonetheless agents of the corporation and do not 
have discretion to ignore the clear directives of their principal, the corporation acting through its 
board.
127
 Thus, the duty of obedience requires an agent to act strictly within the scope of 
authority delegated to him by his principal. 
The business judgment rule should not apply to breaches of the duty of obedience 
because an agent-officer does not have discretion in the first place to make a decision that 
contradicts the clear directive of his principal.
128
 The business judgment rule is a presumption 
that the director or officer in question weighed all of the reasonably available information and 
potential options in good faith and with the appropriate standard of care.
129
 In regards to the duty 
of obedience, however, the agent does not have options to consider. Rather, the agent is 
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obligated to comply strictly with any lawful instructions of her principal. If the agent disagrees 
with the principal’s directive, then the agent’s only option is to inform the principal and try to 
persuade it that another course of action would be more beneficial.
130
 Therefore, the courts 
should not review whether a corporate officer’s decision-making process, or even his decision 
not to comply, was negligent. Instead, the court should only focus on whether the corporate 
officer complied with the lawful directive of the corporation’s board, and the only defense 
available to a corporate officer should be that she did not comply with the board’s order because 
it was unlawful.
131
 
Regardless, the duty of obedience is much less likely to be an issue for officers than it is 
for typical agents because of the broad discretion agents possess. As mentioned, the board 
creates general corporate policies and delegates implementation of those policies to the officers. 
Thus, as long as the officers are operating with the broad scope of that corporate policy created 
by the board, their decisions should be entitled to business judgment deference. However, a 
major issue remains: which employees will be deemed “officers” for purposes of receiving 
business judgment rule protections? 
 
 
 
IV. WHO SHOULD BE AN “OFFICER” FOR PURPOSES OF RECEIVING BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE PROTECTION? 
 
A vital question for determining who should receive the business judgment rule’s 
protections is who will be considered an “officer” under Delaware law. Large public companies, 
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such as large investment and commercial banks, have thousands of vice presidents. Should all of 
these vice presidents receive business judgment rule protection, or should the rule’s protections 
be limited only to those officers exercising some type of high-level executive or supervisory 
power delegated from the board of directors? The question has not been raised in any Delaware 
court because the idea of officers as fiduciaries is relatively novel in Delaware.
132
 However, 
Delaware law and the Model Business Corporation Act provide some clues as to what the 
definition of “officer” should be for business judgment rule application. 
The most important source for defining “officer” under Delaware law is Delaware’s long-
arm statute creating personal jurisdiction over officers of Delaware corporations.
133
 Delaware 
Code Section 3114(b) defines officer as someone who: 
(1) Is or was the president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief 
financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting 
officer of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the 
action or proceeding to be wrongful; 
(2) Is or was identified in the corporation's public filings with the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was 1 of the most 
highly compensated executive officers of the corporation at any time during the 
course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful; or 
(3) Has, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be identified as 
an officer for purposes of this section.
134
 
However, this statute is still relatively vague and leaves open the possibility that a 
number of employees within the corporation will be considered “officers” for purposes of 
receiving business judgment review. Additionally, although vice presidents are not explicitly 
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included in the definition, subsection 3 allows for vice presidents to negotiate for officer status in 
their employment agreements.  
However, simply because an officer is designated in his employment contract as an 
“officer” does not mean that Delaware courts will find that he is an officer for purposes of 
business judgment protection. This issue was discussed in Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, 
Inc., a Third Circuit case applying Delaware law.
135
 Although that case involved the definition of 
“officer” in the corporation’s bylaws, the court’s decision is still relevant to such a designation in 
an employee’s contract because it involved judicial interpretation of the term “officer” and 
whether that included a vice president. 
In Aleynikov the plaintiff, who was a vice president at Goldman Sachs, sued the 
corporation for indemnification and advancement of funds for a separate lawsuit he was 
defending against Goldman.
136
 Plaintiff, a computer programmer at Goldman holding the title of 
vice president, had secretly accepted employment at another company, and subsequently copied 
source code that he developed at Goldman Sachs, which he then transferred to his new 
employer.
137
 Goldman Sachs’ bylaws provided that indemnification and advancement of funds 
would be available to anyone who was “a director, officer, trustee member, stockholder, partner, 
incorporator or liquidator of a Subsidiary” of Goldman Sachs.138 Thus, the question for the court 
was whether Plaintiff’s designation as a vice president qualified him as an “officer” under 
Defendant’s bylaws, thereby making him eligible for indemnification and advancement. 
The court held that the term “officer” was ambiguous in Defendant’s bylaws and allowed 
Defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence showing that Plaintiff’s title of vice president was 
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mere “title inflation,” meaning that he did not actually possess the typical discretion and 
management authority that corporate officers in the investment banking industry wield.
139
 The 
Third Circuit found that Defendant’s extrinsic evidence supported the conclusion that “vice 
president” was merely a functional title showing the seniority and success of one employee 
compared to other employees, and that it was not indicative of the actual managerial discretion 
and authority possessed by the employee.
140
 Consequently, the court found that Plaintiff’s vice 
president title was likely a result of his success at Goldman, not evidence that he possessed the 
typical executive management power that officers usually possess, and it remanded to the district 
court for further determinations.
141
  
The court explicitly stated that whether a vice president was an “officer” depended on the 
usage of trade in particular industries.
142
 This signals that the determination of whether a vice 
president, or other employee with a similar title, will be considered an “officer” may depend on 
how the employee’s title is used in the specific industry. If so, the determination of who is an 
“officer” will likely be a case by case analysis dependent on the norms of the specific industry 
involved. This creates a large amount of uncertainty about who will be protected by the business 
judgment rule. Regardless, the Third Circuit decision shows that courts will look beyond an 
employee’s mere title when deciding if an employee is an officer. Instead, courts will examine 
the executive authority and responsibilities that the employee actually possesses. 
 Additionally, Delaware’s General Corporation Law and the Model Business Corporation 
Act provide some insight on how to define “officer.” Delaware General Corporation Law Section 
142(a) provides that every corporation shall “have such officers with such titles and duties as 
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shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors.”143 This section seems to 
imply that the category of “officers” for business judgment protection should only include those 
positions specifically designated as officer-level positions in a corporation’s bylaws. The Model 
Business Corporations Act also provides that a corporation’s officers shall be those named in the 
bylaws.
144
 However, as evidenced by Aleynikov, courts will not simply rely on an employee’s 
title as dispositive evidence that he is truly an officer.
145
 
 The best approach is that taken by the Third Circuit in Aleynikov. The title of an 
employee should not be dispositive of whether that employee is an officer for purposes of the 
business judgment rule. As discussed earlier, the business judgment rule should only be 
applicable to those officers who are delegated broad discretion and authority by the board so that 
they are effectively acting as the board. Therefore, Delaware courts should look beyond the mere 
formal title of an employee and determine whether that employee is acting with discretion and 
managerial authority that has been delegated to him by the board. Anyone not possessing 
delegated board authority should not enjoy the business judgment rule review. Rather, these 
lower-level managing employees, although technically designated as officers, should not enjoy 
business judgment review, but should be subjected to a more exacting standard of review that 
looks for negligence in both the decision-making process and the substance of the decision itself. 
 However, the Aleynikov analysis should only apply to determine whether an employee is 
an officer for business judgment rule purposes. Courts should not use similar analysis to 
determine whether an employee, designated as an officer in the bylaws, is entitled to the 
indemnification and advancement of funds. The amount of discretion and authority an employee 
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possesses is not determinative of whether that employee is entitled to indemnification and 
advancement of funds under the express terms of a corporation’s bylaws. Courts should not 
rewrite a corporation’s bylaws post-hoc as the Third Circuit did in Aleynikov. However, 
analyzing an employee’s discretion and authority is appropriate when determining if the business 
judgment rule applies. The rule was intended to insulate the board from judicial encroachment 
into its business decisions. Thus, only those officers exercising the discretion and authority 
delegated by the board should be entitled to business judgment protection. 
V. DESPITE THE NEW THEORIES FOR PURSUING OFFICERS PERSONALLY, DELAWARE 
LIKELY WILL NOT SEE AN INCREASE IN SUITS TO HOLD OFFICERS PERSONALLY 
LIABLE. 
 
It is important to understand that cases are rarely seen where a derivative suit is brought 
against an officer who is not also a member of the board, and I have found only one case in 
Delaware.
146
 McPadden illustrates why more of these cases are not brought. Boards’ are very 
hesitant to sue officers for damages, and often choose intra-firm sanctions, such as firing or 
demoting officers, instead of filing suit.
147
 Shareholders are required to make a demand on the 
board for the board to initiate derivative suits against officers
148
, and boards without fail refuse 
the demand in favor of issuing intra-firm sanctions.
149
 The board’s decision not to pursue 
litigation is given great deference by the courts under the business judgment rule.
150
 Therefore, a 
shareholder’s only real chance to bring a derivative suit against an officer is to prove making a 
demand on the board would have been futile because the board was incapable of making an 
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impartial decision, as the plaintiff did in McPadden.
151
 It is the rare case that a plaintiff will 
prove futility, which requires that the plaintiff prove the board acted in bad faith or with self-
interest.
152
 Boards easily avoid questions of self-interest or bad faith by creating special litigation 
committees comprised solely of outside directors, and courts will defer to the decisions of these 
committees. Thus, officers are generally insulated from personal liability by the board choosing 
intra-firm sanctions. 
This serious procedural hurdle is a major barrier to pursuing officers for breaches of their 
fiduciary duties.
153
 Although it has been determined that officers do owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation, Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 is likely to continue dissuading shareholders’ 
attorneys from pursuing officers personally for breaches of their duties. Plaintiffs’ attorneys, who 
work on a contingent fee basis, have financial incentives to pursue directors instead of officers 
because they do not have to incur significant costs clearing the steep procedural hurdles of Rule 
23.1 to sue directors.
154
  
Unless the procedural requirements to sue officers are significantly lessened, officers will 
likely continue to avoid personal liability under Delaware law. Boards rarely, if ever, pursue 
their own officers for breaches of their duties of care because of the availability of cheaper and 
less publicized intra-firm sanctions.
155
 Furthermore, unless a plaintiff is able to meet the steep 
burden of proof for demand futility, courts will continue to defer to special litigation committees’ 
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judgments not to file suits against officers.
156
 Therefore, while there have been major 
developments in the theories to hold officers accountable for breaches of fiduciary duties, major 
procedural barriers remain that will likely prevent any swell in suits holding officers personally 
liable. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As agents of the corporation, officers should not only have fiduciary duties identical to 
those of the board, but also the fiduciary duties agents owe to their principals under common law 
agency rules. Therefore, officers must comply with the duties of care and loyalty, as well as the 
duty of obedience and the duty to inform the board of material information. Furthermore, officers 
should be afforded the protections of the business judgment rule. 
However, the business judgment rule’s application to officers should be more limited than 
it is for directors. First, officers should be held to an ordinary negligence standard of care, not the 
gross negligence standard applicable to directors, when defending against claims that they 
breached their duty of care. Officers should comply with this more exacting standard because 
they are involved with the day-to-day operations of the corporation, have greater access to 
information than the board, and receive much higher and more incentivized compensation than 
the board. Furthermore, business judgment review should not be available to officers when they 
are defending against claims that they breached their duty of obedience or duty to inform the 
board of material information. Finally, when determining who is an officer for purposes of 
business judgment review, the Delaware courts should not only look at an employee’s formal 
title, but also to the discretion and managerial authority he possesses. The rule should only be 
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available for those employees who are designated as officers and are exercising the broad 
discretion and managerial authority delegated by the board of directors.  
Finally, despite these major developments concerning officer personal liability, it is 
unlikely that there will be an increase in suits against officers. The steep procedural hurdles 
created by the demand requirement, coupled with the broad discretion given to a board’s 
decision not to pursue derivative claims and the low success of futility arguments, makes it 
unlikely that plaintiffs’ attorneys will pursue officers. Rather, shareholder suits will likely 
continue to focus on directors. 
